I am a PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam (PETGOV, AISSR).
I work on political professionalisation in India, exploring career populist trajectories. Following that, my research now focuses on party-switching in subnational elections in India.
"Why do parties select switchers as candidates ?"
Party-switching refers to the act of political representatives either switching partisan affiliations - between two consecutive elections or after elections to aid the formation of a governing coalition - or representatives voting across party lines to pass or block a legislative proposal. In India, party-switching is more frequent between consecutive elections because anti-defection laws and the existence of party whip prevents party-switching after elections and cross-party voting during legislation. Existing literature demonstrates that parties switch candidates or candidates switch parties prior to election to avoid anti-incumbency. Yet, anecdotally parties also seem to use switching opportunistically as an expansion strategy to mobilize support from hitherto excluded identity groups, gain financial resources, and strengthen the party’s organizational capacity. Likewise, in addition to avoiding anti-incumbency, candidates may switch parties to acquire better financial and organizational resources and tap career growth opportunities not available within their parent party structure. In this direction, I propose to adopt a supply-and-demand approach to study the phenomena of party-switching and unravel instrumental motives which go beyond avoidance of anti-incumbency. I do so by first examining the role of ethnic proximity between defectors and the constituents; financial and criminal record of the defectors, as well as legal protection and political retributions offered to defectors. In doing so, this research is emphasising party selection over individual opportunism.